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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-2(3)(2)(j).
ADOPTION BY REFERENCE OF BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
PROPERTY RESERVE, INC, AND THE SOUVENIR STOP, INC.
The position asserted by Salt Lake City Corporation (the '"City'") in this appeal is virtually
identical to the position asserted by Appellants Barry Rasmussen and Mark Hammond
(hereinafter "Rasmussen/Hammond"). For that reason, the City hereby adopts by reference and
joins in the Brief filed by Rasmussen/Hammond in its entirety. For the convenience of the
parties and the Court, the City will not attempt to reiterate all the issues and arguments already
addressed by Rasmussen/Hammond, but the City does wish to highlight several of the key facts
and arguments which are central to the City's position in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
The City adopts and joins in the statement of issues set forth in Rasmussen/Hammond's
Brief, particularly issues 2 through 5.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
The City adopts and joins in Rasmussen/Hammond*s citations to determinative statutes
and ordinances. However, in addition to the ordinances identified by Rasmussen/Hammond in
their Brief, the following city ordinance is also determinative of this appeal:
Appeal of Historic Landmark Commission decision to Land Use
Appeals Board: The applicant, any owner of abutting property or
of property located within the same H Historic Preservation
Overlay District, ...aggrieved by the Historic Landmark
Commission's decision, may object to the decision by filing a
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written appeal with the Land Use Appeals Board within thirty (30)
days following the decision.
Salt Lake City Code § 21 A.34.020.F.2.h

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City joins in and incorporates by reference Rasmussen/Hammond's Statement of the
Case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City hereby joins and incorporates by reference Rasmussen/Hammond's Statement
of Facts as set forth in their Brief. However, the City wishes to draw attention to several critical
facts in this case.
1.

On September 13, 2005, Rasmussen/Hammond submitted an application to the

Historic Landmark Commission for a permit to construct a new garage. [R.247.]
2.

Consistent with City ordinances, the City mailed a notice of a public hearing to be

held on November 2, 2005 at 4:00 p.m. in Room 126 of the City and County Building relative to
Rasmussen/Hammond's application to build a garage. The notice described the application as
follows:
Case No. 027-05 at 446 South Douglas Street by Barry Rasmussen and Mark
Hammond, requesting to construct a new garage with access to the abutting alley.
This property is located in the University Historic District.
[R.6, 256-257, 369, 396, 480-81.] The notice also gave the name and phone number of the City
staff member to contact for more information. [R.6, 256-57.]

2

3.

Appellant Steven McCowin, received the notice shortly after September 15,

2005, read the notice, and elected not to attend the public hearing, or to inquire further about the
plans for the garage. [R.130, 369, 396-97, 481.]
4.

On November 5, 2005, the Historic Landmark Commission issued a Certificate of

Appropriateness, and the City issued a building permit, for the construction of the garage.
[R.292-93.]
5.

On July 27, 2006, over 7 1/2 months after the issuance of the building permit, and

after substantial construction had been completed, McCowin filed his administrative appeal of
the City's decision. [R.372, 399.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The City hereby joins in and incorporates by reference Rasmussen/Hammond's Summary
of Argument. However, the City also asserts that this Court should affirm the District Court's
dismissal of McCowin's Complaint based upon alternate grounds which were argued before the
District Court, but which were not the central focus of the District Court's decision. Those
additional arguments are as follows:
1.

McCowin has failed to produce any evidence that the notice which he received

was misleading in any way.
2.

Even assuming for the sake of argument, that there was some defect in the notice,

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 10-9a~209, since no objection to the notice was filed within
30 days, that notice is now deemed "adequate and proper" by operation of law.
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3.

McCowin's claims are barred due to his failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies by either filing an appeal with City Land Use Appeals Board or the City Board of
Adjustment.
4.

McCowin's complaint is untimely because pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §

10-9a-801(2), any person adversely affected by an administrative decision must file a petition for
review with the District Court within 30 days after the local land use decision is final.
ARGUMENT
The City joins in and incorporates by reference the argument set forth by
Rasmussen/Hammond in their Brief. The City also wishes to highlight the following specific
arguments:
I. McCowin has failed to demonstrate any
deficiency in the notice sent by the City.
McCowin argues that any notice sent by the City must identify the substance of the
matter at issue. In the present case, Rasmussen/Hammond filed an application to build a garage,
the dimensions of which are allowed under the Salt Lake City Code. The notice sent to
McCowin indicated that the property owner was seeking permission to build a garage. The
notice did not attempt to set forth all of the particulars of the application, including the square
footage of the garage, the number of cars it might hold, whether it would have windows, the
height of the building, or the pitch of the roof. Instead, the notice provided the name and phone
number of a City Planning staff member who could address any of those types of questions.
It is undisputed that McCowin received the notice, and that he declined to attend the
scheduled hearing or even to call and inquire as to the parameters of the proposed building. It is
also undisputed that the building constructed by Rasmussen/Hammond is in fact a garage, which

is defined in the City Code as "a building, or portion thereof, used to store or keep a motor
vehicle." (See Salt Lake City Code § 21 A.62.040.)
Nothing in the City Code, or in any other authority cited b\ McCowin suggests that every
notice must contain every relevant detail of a proposed structure, or a description of every
activity which may occur within a proposed structure. Thus, homes may be single or two story,
they may have attached or detached garages, they may include hobby shops or home offices, and
garages may have storage lofts. The mere fact that every detail of every proposed application is
not set forth in every notice does not make the notice defective or misleading. Indeed, given the
volume of building applications received and processed by the City, it would be virtually
impossible for City staff to attempt to identify every relevant detail of every building application
in every notice. Instead, as required by the City Code, City notices identify "the substance of the
application" with the name and phone number of an individual who may provide additional
details upon request.
Thus, McCowin has failed to demonstrate any deficiency in the notice he received and
chose to ignore.
IL McCowin's objection to the form of the
notice is untimely and barred by Utah law.
Utah Code Annotated § 10-9a-209 states that 'if notice given under the authority of this
part is not challenged... within 30 days after the meeting or action for which notice is given, the
notice is considered adequate and proper.'"
It is undisputed that McCowin did not contest the adequacy of the notice within that 30
day period. Instead, McCowin has argued that the time period for contesting the notice should
be tolled based upon equitable principles. However, in order to prevail on that argument,
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McCowin must first demonstrate that the notice provided was misleading (which he has not) and
that he acted with reasonable diligence. In Russell Packard Development Inc. v. Carson, 108
P.3d 741 (Utah 2005), the Court stated that before a plaintiff may invoke the equitable discovery
rule, there must also be "a demonstration that the parties seeking to exercise the rule has acted in
a reasonable and diligent manner." 108 P.2d at 747. More specifically, the Court stated that
"whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry
is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient
information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it." First American Title
Insurance Company v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 838 (Utah 1998), cited in Russell supra,
at 750.
Based upon the facts of this case, McCowin simply cannot claim that he acted with
reasonable diligence when, after having received notice from the City of the proposed
construction of a garage, McCowin neglected to either attend the hearing or to inquire further
concerning the details of the proposal. Thus, McCowin's Complaint is barred by U.C.A. § 109a~209.
HI. McCowin's claim is barred due to his
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
It is well established under Utah law that "no person may challenge in District Court, a
municipality's land use decision made under this chapter, or under regulation made under the
authority of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies..."
U.C.A. § 10-9a-801(l).
Under the Salt Lake City Code, the appropriate administrative appeal for the decision
approving the Certificate of Appropriateness for Rasmussen/Hammond's garage and the issuance
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of the building permit for that garage would have been either to the Salt Lake City Land Use
Appeals Board or to the Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment. McCowin did not file an appeal
with either body. Instead, in July 2006, McCowin filed an appeal of the City's administrative
decision directly with Third District Court, in contravention of the Utah Statute.
Utah case law clearly indicates that absent extraordinary circumstances, a Plaintiff must
exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review of an
administrative decision. See Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office. 621 P.2d 1234, 1237
(Utah 1980). This requirement must be strictly enforced. See Patterson v. American Fork City,
2003 Utah 7, f 17, 67 P.3d 466. For that reason, McCowin's Complaint is barred in its entirety.
IV. McCowin's Complaint is not Timely FiledL
Even if McCowin were somehow able to overcome all of the other defects discussed
above, his Complaint is still untimely because it was not filed within 30 days following the
City's decision. U.C.A. § 10-9a-8Gl(2)(a) states:
Any person adversely affected by final decision made in the exercise or in
violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the
decision with the District Court within 30 days after the local land use decision is
final:'

There is no dispute that McCowin's Complaint in this action was not filed until
approximately 7 1/2 months after the City's decision approving the construction of the garage.
Based upon those clear facts, McCowin's Complaint is untimely and must be dismissed.
There are sound policy reasons for this filing deadline. Allowing a disgruntled neighbor
to contest the legitimacy of the City's notice and decision making process for a building, several
months after the issuance of a building permit and several months after construction has
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proceeded would create substantial prejudice to the property owner, and would seriously impair
the City's ability to approve development projects and issue building permits. At some point, a
property owner is entitled to rely upon the permit issued by the City, and if the time period for
challenge as provided by State law has lapsed, the property owner should feel free to proceed
without the risk that that approval will later be second guessed or overturned by the court.
In this case, where McCowin received notice, but deliberately neglected to attend the
hearing, or even to inquire regarding the nature of the project, he cannot be heard to complain
simply because the building constructed was different than he might have expected. The Utah
Statutes providing firm deadlines for raising such complaints are intended to protect the public
against precisely this kind of delayed challenge.
Conclusion
For all of the reasons discussed above, this Court should affirm the District Court's
Judgment dismissing McCowin's Complaint with prejudice.
DATED this Z*£_ day of July, 2007.

^L^WRPXCE
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake City Corporation
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